Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers

10-29-2009

“Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In Search of the
Right Mix in the Face of Climate Change
Henry Tulkens
CORE - Université catholique de Louvain, Henry.tulkens@uclouvain.be

Vincent van Steenberghe
Belgian Federal Ministry for the Environment

Follow this and additional works at: http://services.bepress.com/feem
Recommended Citation
Tulkens, Henry and van Steenberghe, Vincent, "“Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In Search of the Right Mix in the Face of Climate
Change" (October 29, 2009). Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers. Paper 340.
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper340

This working paper site is hosted by bepress. Copyright © 2009 by the author(s).

Tulkens and van Steenberghe: “Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering”: In Search of the Right

“Mitigation, Adaptation, Suffering” :
In search of the right mix in the face of climate change1
Henry Tulkens2
CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve

and Vincent van Steenberghe
Belgian Federal Ministry for the Environment, Brussels

June 2009
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT MEMORANDUM n°94
of the Chaire Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics and Management
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

ABSTRACT
The usually assumed two categories of costs involved in climate change policy analysis,
namely abatement and damage costs, hide the presence of a third category, namely
adaptation costs. This dodges the determination of an appropriate level for them. Including
adaptation costs explicitly in the total environmental cost function allows one to characterize
the optimal (cost minimizing) balance between the three categories, in statics as well as in
dynamics. Implications are derived for cost benefit analysis of adaptation expenditures.

CONTENTS
1. A classical model
2. Introducing adaptation
3. Optimal adaptation
4. An « optimally adapted » damage cost function
5. The right mix — Static case
6. Adaptation over time: investment and the optimal
stock of adaptation equipment
7. Conclusion: implications for integrated assessment
modeling and cost-benefit analysis
References

1

Paper presented at the conference “Challenges in Public Economics” held at Université de Liège in
honor of Professor Pierre Pestieau, June 3, 2009. Thanks are due to the participants in an earlier
meeting of the CLIMNEG Ateliers de l’environnement held at CORE, Louvain la Neuve for their
remarks and especially to Thierry Bréchet and Jean-Pascal van Ypersele for constructive suggestions.
2
Corresponding author <henry.tulkens@uclouvain.be>

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

1

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 340 [2009]

Tulkens & van Steenberghe 2009

2/15

Mitigating, Adapting, Suffering:
In search of the right mix while facing climate change

1 A classical model
The simplest and most standard form of modeling that serves as a basis for the
economic theoretic analysis of international environmental agreements on climate change is
the following3 :

J i = c i (ei ) + di (ΔT)

where

ΔT = F(e1,...,ei ,...,en ) i = 1,…,n.

(1)

In this model (called hereafter the “c+d model”),
• the index i denotes all countries of the world,
• the variables ei ≥ 0 are the countries’ flows of emissions of CO2 “greenhouse gas”,
• and ΔT is the resulting world temperature change from some initial date, say 1800;
• the transfer function4 F( . ) (assumed increasing) describes the highly complex process
whereby greenhouse gas emissions induce temperature increases all around the
globe,
• ci(ei) is a function (assumed decreasing and convex) describing the cost to country i of
its abatement decisions, that is, of reducing its emissions , also called “mitigation”,
• di(ΔT) is a function (increasing and strictly5 convex) that denotes the cost of the
damages incurred by country i as a result of temperature change ,
• and finally Ji is the overall environmental cost borne by country i, adding up abatement
and damage costs. All costs are measured in € per unit of time and all functions
assumed to be differentiable.

When working with this standard model of multilateral externality6 due to the
phenomenon described by the function F(.), the literature7 considers two alternative patterns
of behavior of the countries: in the first one, each country behaves so as to minimize its
overall environmental cost J i just defined by choosing in isolation emissions ei , and taking
3

It was formulated first by MÄLER 1989, in a slightly different form because the application was to
the acid rains problem.
4
While the simplified expression above prevents one to understand the details of that transformation,
the stated function is sufficient to evoke the fact of the by now universally recognized influence of
anthropogenic CO2 emissions (and accumulation – more on this below) on temperature change.
5
By assuming linear damage cost curves with intercept at zero, STERN 2007 (p459) precludes the
analysis developed in this paper.
6
Also to be characterized as a “global public good” due to the diffuse (as opposed to directional)
nature of the way it occurs
7

A non technical presentation of which is offered in EYCKMANS and TULKENS 2005.
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as given the emissions e j of the other countries: a Nash type of behavior. According to the
second pattern, the countries choose jointly emissions e*i so as to minimize

∑

n

J , that is,

i=1 i

the sum of the countries’ overall costs, and thus internalizing at the world level the
multilateral externality occurring : a Paretian behavior.

In either case, a balance is struck between the costs of mitigation ci(ei) and the costs of
damages di(ΔT), which is easily obtained from the first order conditions of the maximization
problems involved in the two alternative patterns of behavior. In the class-room simplifying
case of a linear additive form ΔT =

∑

n

e of the transfer function F(.), these conditions look

i =1 i

as follows:
— the Nash equilibrium is a vector (e1 ,..., en , ΔT ) such that

ci′(ei ) = di′(ΔT ) , i=1,…,n,
or, in words, such that in each country abatement be pushed and damages be incurred up
to the point where marginal abatement cost equals the domestic marginal damage cost,
while
— Pareto efficiency is a vector (e1∗ ,..., en∗ , ΔT * ) such that

ci′(e*i ) = ∑ j =1 d ′j (ΔT * ) , i=1,…,n,
n

or, in words, such that abatement be pushed and damages be incurred up to the point
where in each country marginal abatement cost equals the sum over all countries of their
domestic marginal damage costs.

In summary, these conditions identify alternative levels for the mitigation activities, based on
the damages they allow to avoid.
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2 Introducing adaptation
There is an important difference in nature between the two categories of costs
involved: while abatement costs are “out of pocket” expenditures resulting from voluntary
decisions to abate, damage costs are rather incurred in terms of lost values, most often
undergone involuntarily, and not resulting from expenditure decisions.
In this interpretation, the option of adaptation is not explicitly brought up, and some
authors assert that it need not be because adaptation can be considered as implicit in the
damage functions di (.). These should be seen, they argue, as net of adaptation expenditures.
Yet, this eschews the issue of what is an appropriate level of adaptation, an important issue
because adaptation activities are not free. Indeed, they entail out of pocket costs of their own,
which vary with their size. On the other hand, what is the economic justification for
adaptation expenditures? It essentially lies in their contribution to reducing the damages
incurred or their cost, either by avoiding the physical damages or by circumventing their
effects thanks to protection from their impacts.
Now, these adaptation costs can possibly be higher or lower than the damage cost
reductions they are meant to achieve. They would obviously be justified only in the latter
case, but to what extent? In this note, we provide an answer to that question, taking account
of its effect on the countries’ overall environmental costs stated above.

Adaptation is made explicit in the c+d model by:
(i) Specifying in terms of an aggregate magnitude that we denote by αi ≥ 0 the physical8
activities whereby a country i seeks to protect itself against the effects of global
warming and by having them appear as the argument of an additional cost function
ai(αi), increasing, that accounts for the adaptation expenditures made in country i.
(ii) Introducing αi as an additional argument in the function di to make it read di(ΔT,αi),
with the assumed properties that for every ΔT, ∂di /∂α i < 0 and

∂ 2 di

∂ΔT.∂α i < 0

while keeping ∂di /∂ΔT > 0, ∂ 2 di /∂ΔT 2 > 0 . The costs accounted for with this function
do not include adaptation costs anymore, since these have just been stated separately
with ai(αi). They are only costs incurred from damages undergone involuntarily as
suggested above, for short “suffered damage costs” - see below). The two derivatives
with respect to α i imply respectively that more adaptation reduces not only the total
8

This specification excludes what TOL 2005 calls “facilitative adaptation”, the modeling of which
requires a more general model of the economy.
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suffered costs incurred (graphically in the €-ΔT space, a shift downward of the whole
curve) but also the marginal such costs (i.e. a reduction in the slope of the curve)9.
We then have three sources of costs, and these lead us to modify the usual expression
(1) for the overall environmental cost of each country into the following function with three
terms:

J i = c i (ei ) + ai (α i ) + di (ΔT, α i )

where

ΔT = F(e1,...,ei ,...,en ) .

(2)

These three sources of costs are precisely those that come to the mind of an economist when
reading, as in our title: “Civilization has only three options: mitigation (…), adaptation (…) and
suffering (…)”. With this trilogy John Holdren (2008, p. 430) compactly and beautifully
summarizes what can be done in the face of climate change.
He pursues with what I read as a direct challenge to economists that we hardly can
leave unanswered: “We are already doing some of each and will do more of all but what the mix will
be depends on choices that society will make going forward”. Within the above framework and
with the help of some economic theory we feel we can enlighten these choices in the
direction of what should be done or, in other terms, what would be the “right” mix. One way
to do that in the c+d framework is to abandon the ambiguous “damage cost” terminology
used for di(ΔT) in the function (1), split the function instead into the two components of
“adaptation cost” ai(αi) and “suffered damage cost”10 di(ΔT,αi) and approach in those terms
the right mix question.

3 Optimal adaptation
Notice first the two opposing roles played by the adaptation variable αi in the second
and third terms of the new overall cost function (2): increasing and decreasing, respectively.
This suggests that when we introduce adaptation in the minimization, a balance is also
struck between these two aspects of it. More precisely, the first order condition for a
minimum of Ji with respect to αi is that it satisfies

dai / dα i + ∂ di (ΔT , α i ) / ∂α i = 0 .

(3)

In words:

9

The justification of this second property will appear below as a condition for α to be positive at an
optimum.
10
We think this Holdren inspired expression better reflects the reality at stake than the one of
“residual” damage cost, used e.g. by TOL 2005 as well as STERN 2007 and DE BRUIN, DELLINCK
and TOL 2007.
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Proposition 1 : Adaptation is achieved optimally in a country if it is pushed up to a level where the
cost to the country of more adaptation becomes equal to the value of the suffered costs thereby avoided.
Beyond its apparent banality, notice the following properties of the rule so
established:
(i) Condition (3) holds for both Nash and Paretian behaviors, since they both result from
some form of global cost minimization.
(ii) The rule applies to each country separately: the optimality condition is a purely
domestic one. There is neither an international externality nor a global public
good involved 11.
(iii) The condition holds true for any level of ΔT.
(iv) The condition is independent of the abatement policy ei of country i, but it varies
with the state ΔT of the environment.
Of course, properties (i), (iii) and (iv) do not imply that the total amount of optimal
adaptation expenditure is the same in the various occurrences where the marginal
occurrences hold.
While properties (ii) and (iv) are in agreement with two of TOL’s 2005 propositions,
our setting does not support his presentation of adaptation and mitigation as “policy
substitutes”, subject to some kind of “trade-off”. This view indeed derives from reasoning at
constant total environmental cost Ji and keeping ΔT constant. But when ΔT is taken to vary, say
to increase, adaptation and mitigation expenditures contribute together to the increase in total
cost, and especially to its minimization if (3) keeps being satisfied.
Aside from this question of terminology, let us focus our interest on what the rule
allows one to say conceptually, and to do in practice, when it is not satisfied in one or several
countries. We consider first some conceptual developments.

4 An « optimally adapted » damage cost function
Let αι* be the amount of adaptation activities that satisfies the minimization condition
(3) for some country i. Unless di(ΔT, αi) is separable, this magnitude is likely to vary as a

11

Unless, of course, an adaptation activity carried out in one country has spillover effects in one of
several neighboring ones. This can be accommodated in condition (3) in a fairly straightforward way,
but entails amendments in the reasoning that follow.
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function of ΔT. It should therefore rather be written as αi*(ΔT). As a result, the second and
third terms of (2) may be seen as a function of ΔΤ only and read together as
hi*(ΔT) = ai(αi*(ΔT)) + di(ΔT, αi*(ΔT))

(4)

with the asterisk reminding one that adaptation is optimal at any point along the function.
We shall call hi*(ΔT) country i’s “optimally adapted” damage cost function.

Graphically (Figure 1), the function hi*(ΔT) appears as an envelope of a family of
suffered damage cost functions di(ΔT,αi) as defined earlier. In the space (€,ΔT), the graphs of
these functions differ from one another according to the amount of adaptation expenditure
and level of these activities ai(αi) chosen by the country. Formally, the difference between
these functions results from a difference in costs that are fixed with respect to ΔΤ. This is
similar to differences between alternative short run cost functions enveloped by the long run
one in standard microeconomics. This analogy is pursued further by noticing that with every
(fixed) adaptation expenditure ai(αi) there is logically associated a specific suffered cost
function di(ΔT, αi), variable with ΔΤ and where αI is a parameter. Hence, for any given ΔΤ
the optimal adaptation expenditure is the one whose associated suffering cost function is
tangent, at the point ΔΤ , to the envelope of all possible suffering cost functions.

€

di(ΔT, αi)

αi*(ΔT1)

hi*(ΔT)

ΔΤ
ΔT1

Figure 1 Two suffered damage cost functions “enveloped” by an optimally adapted damage cost function

From the tangency points in this diagram there emerges an interesting property: for any
given level of temperature change, say ΔT1, the optimal adaptation expenditure ai(αi*(ΔT1) is
the one for which:
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dhi∗ (ΔT )
∂ di (ΔT , α i∗ (ΔT ))
=
.
dΔT ΔT = ΔT
∂ΔT
ΔT = ΔT
1

(5)

1

In words,
Proposition 2 : The marginal adapted damage cost entailed by temperature change is equal to the
marginal suffering costs only and does not include costs of adaptation.

This results from taking into account the optimality condition (3) on α in the specification of
the marginal adapted damage cost which is derived from (4). Indeed, and more explicitly, from
this condition one has (dropping momentarily the arguments of the functions, to alleviate, as
well as the subscript i which is immaterial here) :

dh *
=
dΔT

da dα
dα dΔT

=

dα
dΔT

=

∂d
.
∂ΔT

+
α =α *

∂ d ∂ d dα
+
∂ΔT ∂α dΔT

α =α *

∂d
⎛ da ∂ d ⎞
+
⎜⎝
⎟⎠ +
∂α
∂ΔT
α = α * dα

di(ai(αi*(z2), ΔΤ)

hi*(ΔΤ)

di(ai(αi*(z1),ΔΤ)

€

)
A

ai(αi*(z2)

B

C

ai(αi*(z1)
z1

ΔΤ1

z2

ΔΤ

Figure 2 Two suffered damage cost functions di(ai, ΔT) with non optimal adaptation for target ΔT1
and damage cost function optimally adapted for all ΔT
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In the presentation of Figure 2, non optimal adaptation is illustrated in the following
way. Taking ΔT1 as a target or alternatively as the prevailing situation, that is, as the
temperature change to be achieved or actually occurring, if adaptation expenditure ai is equal
to ai(αi*(z1), then country i adapts too little, the excess cost (of suffering) being AC at the
target. A hint of this is given by the fact that at C, whose abscissa is the target, the marginal
suffering cost is higher than what it would be if adaptation were larger. Therefore, adapting
more costs less than the suffering cost it saves. Alternatively, if ai is equal to ai(αi*(z2), country i
adapts too much, the excess cost at the target being BC at the target. Here, a sign of excess
adaptation is that at the target the additional suffering cost from adapting less is of lower
value than the savings made from reducing adaptation activities.

5 The right mix — Static case
Going back now to our initial query of identifying the “right” amounts of mitigation,
adaptation and suffering, let us reconsider it in the light of what we have developed so far.
Everything is now driven by the newly defined overall environmental cost function (2). With
optimal adaptation α *i it reads:

J i∗ = c i (ei ) + ai (α ∗i (ΔT)) + di (ΔT, α ∗i (ΔT))
= ci(ei) + hi*(ΔT)
and may be called the optimally adapted overall environmental cost function. Its further
minimization with respect to mitigation (ei), and temperature change (ΔT) yields the right mix
in the following terms:
— In the case of the Nash equilibrium, a vector (e1 ,..., en , α 1 ,..., α n , ΔT ) such that for every i,

dci (ei )
dei e =e
i

=

i

=

dhi* (ΔT )
dΔT ΔT =ΔT
∂di
∂ΔT ΔT =ΔT

, i=1,…,n,

and
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dai
dα i α =α
i i

∂di (ΔT , α i (ΔT ))
∂α i
α =αi
i

=

— In the case of Pareto efficient behaviors, a vector (e1∗* ,..., en∗* , α 1** ,..., α n** , ΔT ** ) such that for
every i,

dci (ei )
dei e =e**
i

= ∑ i =1
n

i

dhi* (ΔT )
dΔT ΔT =ΔT **

∂d
= ∑ i =1 i
∂ΔT ΔT =ΔT **

, i=1,…,n,

n

and

dai
dα i α =α **
i i

=

∂di (ΔT , α i (ΔT ))
.
∂α i
α =α **
i i

In words, we have

Proposition 3 : The right mix of mitigation, adaptation and suffering is the one such that in all
countries:
— marginal emissions abatement cost be equal to marginal suffering cost entailed by temperature
change (domestic or global, according to the behavior considered), and
— marginal adaptation cost be equal to marginal domestic suffering cost avoided thanks to such
adaptation.

6. Adaptation over time: investment and the optimal stock of adaptation equipment
The preceding analysis is entirely formulated in static terms, which means that all
variables represent flows per unit of time. However, most examples of adaptation activities
that come to mind imply investments in infrastructural equipments such as, for instance,
dikes to protect against sea level rise. It is therefore essential to show whether and how the
analysis can be extended to a dynamic context involving investment in protective physical
capital of all kinds.
To proceed in this way, let us think in discrete time, with unit periods denoted t =
1,2,… . The climatic change ΔΤt that takes place at time t entails at that moment suffered
damages for country i whose value is dit , expressed in €/time unit. The adaptation activities,
which allow to attenuate these damages can take various forms. Some are “ephemeral” in the
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sense that they only reduce dit at time t itself, whereas other ones are durable and exert their
protective effects over several time periods. In the first case, the protective activities are
flows, and we denote them αit , whereas in the second case, they consist in accumulating in
country i

12

a stock of protective equipments — in fact, a capital — whose amount at time t

we denote Bit . Its durability over time is expressed by specifying :

Bit = Bit−1 (1− δβ ) + β it

(6)

where βit is the addition made to the stock at time t and δβ is the depreciation rate of the
stock during period t. The value of this last parameter varies of course according to the
nature of the equipments involved, as well as with their life time. Here, we limit ourselves to
a reasoning in aggregate terms, without ignoring that a disaggregate formulation, in terms of
projects, is necessary for making policy relevant proposals. Our last section will go in that
direction.
Let us denote by bi(βit) the expenditure entailed in country i by the addition βit of
protective equipments at time t. As far as the suffered damages are concerned, the existing
stock of protective equipment now enters the damage cost function di , next to the flow of
ephemeral protective activities, as follows:
dit = di(ΔTt, αit, Βit),

(7)

the function being decreasing in its last two arguments.
The above leads us to redefine at each period t the overall environmental cost (2) of
country i as
Jit = ci(eit) + ai(αit) + bi(βit) + di(ΔTt, αit, Βit)

(8)

where Bit = Bit−1 (1− δβ ) + β it
and ΔTt = G(Tt−1,e1t ,...,eit ,...,ent ) ,
whose four components represent the four cost categories of mitigation, short term and long
run adaptation and suffered damages, respectively13.
The variable αit — the ephemeral (short term) actions of adaptation — plays, within
each period t, the same opposite two roles as in the preceding static analysis. One can thus
similarly define at each t a specific optimally adapted overall environmental cost, that is, a
cost including ephemeral adaptation expenditures αit* that verify :
12

The qualification mentioned in footnote 7 above applies.
The schematic temperature transfer function is modified here to account for the essentially dynamic
nature of climate models which involve CO2 accumulation.
13
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dai /dα it + ∂di /∂α it = 0,

t = 1,2,... .

(9)

A parallel role is played by the stock of equipments trough the variables involved in
durable adaptation, namely the level of the stock Bit and the flow of periodic additions to it

βit . While the latter increase expenditures at time t, the former reduces the cost of suffered
damages: there is thus a tradeoff, like before.

However, the formulation of optimality

conditions is more complex for two reasons. First, the reduction of damages resulting from
each action βit spreads over several future periods: to account completely for the benefit so
obtained the analysis must become an intertemporal one, identifying for projects or
equipments decided at time t the reduction in suffered damages occurring at each period τ =
t, t+1, t+2,… of their life time. This brings about another dimension of the issue under
consideration, namely that investments in adaptive protection do not necessarily take place
once and for all, but instead can be realized, and in fact are, in terms of programs extending
over several time periods. Therefore what is at stake at each t is not just one investment
decision βit but rather a sequence of them βit , βit+1, βit+2,… ,βiT — in other words an investment
program where T is the horizon planning of the decision maker.
Optimality in durable adaptation equipments is then to be formulated at each time t
in terms of an investment program, combined with ephemeral adaptation activities that
solves:
T

Min T

∑γ

{α iτ , β iτ }τ =t τ = t

τ

[ ai(αiτ) + bi(βiτ) + di(ΔΤt, αiτ , Biτ) ]

(10)

where Biτ = Biτ −1 (1− δβ ) + β iτ ,

ΔTτ = G(Tτ −1,e1τ ,...,eiτ ,...,enτ ) ,
∗
and γ>0 is a discount factor. Let α ∗it ,α ∗it +1,α ∗it +2 ,...,α ∗iT , β it∗ , β it∗ +1, β it∗ +2 , ..., β iT
be the solution to

(10). The first order conditions that characterize this solution obviously satisfy (9) and also
imply that at each t the adaptation investment β it∗ made at that time in country i satisfies

dbi /dβ it +

T

∑γ

τ −t

(1− δβ )τ −t ∂di /∂Biτ = 0 .

(11)

τ=t

In words, at any point in time t investment in adaptation is optimal only if at the margin its cost is
equal to the value discounted at time t of the future suffered damages it will allow to avoid.
After introducing these investment levels in the function (8) as well as the ephemeral
activities α ∗it satisfying (9), the overall environmental cost of country i at time t, with both
short run and long run optimal adaptation, reads:

J it∗ = c i (eit ) + ai (α ∗it (ΔTt )) + bi (β it∗ ) + di (ΔTt ,α ∗it (ΔTt ),Bit∗ )

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper340
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where Bit∗ (ΔTt ) = Bit−1 (1− δβ ) + β it∗
and ΔTt = G(Tt−1,e1t ,...,eit ,...,ent ) .
Intuitively, and as it was the case with (2), an envelope property links in (12), at each t, the
second and fourth terms of this function. In terms of Figures 1 and 2, the presence of Bit∗ in
the suffered damage function di (.) just shifts its graph upwards or downwards.

7 Conclusion: implications for integrated assessment modeling and cost-benefit analysis .
In most static as well as dynamic models, introducing adaptation in the damage cost
functions leads to expressions such as Ji* where adaptation is indeed implicit. I derive from
this, and from the above explicitation of this practice, four implications for future policy
modeling and decisions.

1°) In all IAMs (Integrated Assessment Models), the optimality condition on emissions is
always, for each country, the equality of abatement marginal cost with damage marginal
cost14.

Is that just damage costs incurred, or does it include adaptation expenditures?

Equality (5) teaches us that if adaptation is optimal, only undergone suffering costs are to be
taken into account, without adding anything from adaptation expenditures. This does not
mean that adaptation expenditure are to be ignored in general, but well, instead, that they
must be handled “separately”, taking good care of whether their size indeed meets the
conditions (3) or (9) — see 3° below.
2°) Therefore, it should always be examined in detail in all Integrated Assessment models
whether or not they have included adaptation, as well as whether the amount of expenditure
for it is an appropriate one.
3°) Most importantly, condition (3) and intertemporal conditions (9) and (11) for optimal
adaptation may be considered as a reference to guide the evaluation of investment projects in
adaptation equipments, as well as the selection among them when they are numerous.
The method to be followed is essentially the following: for every project under consideration
at time t, the expenditure it requires may be assimilated to the first term of the equalities (9)
or (11), depending upon the nature of the project – a fairly easy task. By contrast, the
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numerical evaluation of the right hand sides of these equations, for each individual project, is
a major challenge, although an inescapable one if economic rationality is to prevail in the
decision to adopt or discard projects. Bundling projects may of course be considered in the
same spirit.
The conditions referred to are formulated here in terms of “marginal” magnitudes because
they are obtained from functions which are assumed to be differentiable. But of course, each
project is a discrete unit. This does not put in question the relevance of applying to such
discrete units the optimality conditions stated above, for the following two reasons:
— One is working here at a scale where each project is small with respect to the total
investments involved;
— If one thinks of solving the optimization problem that leads to (3) and (9) - (11) in terms of
an algorithm of gradual adjustment of the variables involved towards minimum cost,
with the adjustment operating in discrete real time, one can see the various projects as
being stages of this algorithm. Each project, when adopted because the benefits it entails
(the value of the damages it allows to avoid) are larger than its out of pocket cost, is to be
interpreted as a step towards this minimum.
4°) Resource transfers between countries are advocated in the literature for moving from
Nash equilibria to Pareto efficiency. While most often designed as lump sum transfers,
they could instead be earmarked and exclusively devoted to adaptation and mitigation
expenditures so as to have (3) and (9)-(11) satisfied. NORDHAUS and YANG 2006 make
proposals in that direction.
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